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Using Cultural Theory to Navigate the Policy Process 




Cultural Theory’s (CT) four ‘cultural biases’ hold an intuitive appeal and empirical resonance for 
policy scholars as they seek to make sense of complex policy contexts. Yet research applications of 
CT are often hampered by superficial classifications and a lack of operationalisable measures. This 
article solves these problems, presenting valid measures in a ‘compass’ and ‘map’ to show how 
cultural patterns are both ‘internalised’ in individuals and ‘institutionalised’ in policy contexts. Key 
tensions here provide researchers with new interpretive tools to promote better questioning, 
learning and adaptation within particular policy environments, including opportunities for research 
impact through practical, ‘institutional work’.  
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Introduction 
Lasswell’s (1951) seminal notion of effective policy analysis combines the ‘technical’ tasks of ‘the 
scientific study of problems’ and ‘policymaking around these problems’ (Turnbull, 2008). Yet 
uncertainty and complexity are widely acknowledged to structure contemporary policy-making 
environments (e.g. Geyer & Cairney, 2015). Phenomena such as bounded rationality (Simon, 1955) 
and ‘wicked’ policy problems (Rittel & Webber, 1973) mean that sense-making often relies on more 
than simply scientific analysis. Grint (2005:1473) therefore observes that to make progress in 
confronting often intractable problems, ‘the task is to ask the right questions rather than provide the 
right answers’. Complexity therefore places a premium on not only evidence and judgment, but also 
the ability to question, learn and adapt.  
In the face of this complexity, institutions matter. Policymakers use institutions to establish and 
prioritise particular values, norms, rules and roles, thereby reducing the complexity of choice. 
Sometimes this can be a very positive process, inspiring a flow of ideas and fast-thinking-type 
solutions to policy problems that ‘fit’ with the policy context. However, sometimes institutions can 
get in the way - reinforcing values, systems and practices that no longer fit so well, and acting as 
blinders to emerging issues. So how do policymakers develop effective policymaking strategies when 
they are so limited by bounded rationality? Do their ‘cognitive frailties’ make them over-reliant on a 
combination of rational and irrational informational shortcuts to act quickly and make adequate 
decisions? If so, should institutions be designed to limit their autonomous powers, or instead should 
their ability to develop such heuristics be celebrated, and work be undertaken with them to refine 
such techniques? This article mobilises Cultural Theory (CT) to address such questions, allowing 





The central problem addressed by this article is thus identified: policy is complex and mediated by 
institutions, and therefore ‘institutional work’ is needed to enhance the prospects of policy success. 
However, this raises some further key questions for policy researchers:  
 What are the dominant institutional patterns that tend to structure policy problems and 
guide policymakers’ response?  
 How can institutional analysis assist in asking better questions in order to advance policy 
learning?  
 How can research help identify and promote appropriate adaptations in particular policy 
contexts through the institutional work of ‘creating, maintaining and disrupting institutions’ 
(Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006)?  
This article addresses these challenging questions through CT’s parsimonious framework, which 
constitutes institutions in four, rivalrous ‘cultural biases’ (hierarchy, individualism, egalitarianism and 
fatalism). This theory is popular and has been applied across (i) a diverse range of empirical fields 
(see Swedlow, 2014 for a review), (ii) different elements of the policy-cycle (from tasks of problem 
definition, modelling, alternative selection, and argument presentation to those of implementation 
and termination; e.g. Geva-May, 1997), and (iii) different levels and scales of activity (e.g. 
Mamadouh, 1999). In this way, the theory is claimed to provide some common frames of reference 
that benefit the work of policy scholars, including their engagement with practical policy actors 
(including professional advisors, commentators or other ‘policy entrepreneurs’ and those 
responsible for policy implementation - officials, managers and professionals). 
Yet the alleged strength of CT’s conceptual application can also prove a weakness if it results in 
superficiality. This includes what Mamadouh (1999) calls ‘birdspotting’ (whereby analysts spot 
illustrative examples of the four ideal-type categories while offering little by way of further 
explanation). This is grist to the mill of critics who claim that CT over-simplifies complex phenomena 
and so is insufficiently ‘scientific’ (e.g.Boholm, 1996; Tansey & O’Riordan, 1999). Meanwhile, 
answers must also be found to the concerns of scholars seeking to use CT (who often struggle to 
systematically apply its theoretical refinements or engage with its state of the art), or practitioners 
who, anecdotally, sometimes struggle to get beyond the sense that, while ‘somehow all this 
matters’, it is hard in practical terms to ‘know what to do’ with the results.  
Progress here has been further hampered by a lack of operationalisable measures. In response, this 
article places some new measurement tools at the heart of its discussion (cf. Simmons, 2016). These 
measures allow researchers to build a ‘map’ of institutional (in)congruence, comparing how things 
‘actually are’ with how they ‘should be’ as a way of generating creative institutional dialogue and 
avoiding counterproductive institutional conflicts. They further allow researchers to understand the 
implications of policymakers following their ‘internal compass’ (based on informational and 
institutional shortcuts). In this way, these measures show the direction in which the compass is 
pointing and compare this with the guidance provided by the ‘map’. Key tensions here provide 
researchers with better interpretive tools that promote more informed institutional analysis in 
particular policy environments. In turn, this enables researchers to consider policymakers’ ability and 
willingness to ask better questions as they navigate their policymaking environment, as well as 
providing practical opportunities for research impact through more grounded discussions about 




In short, this article uses CT to shine a light on these institutional dynamics and provide policy 
researchers with some useful heuristics to navigate this terrain. In what follows, the article first 
introduces the CT framework and some of the tools it provides in helping researchers make sense of 
institutions; framing different institutional logics and how they relate to one another. The problems 
of measurement in CT and how these are addressed by the new measurement tool are then 
discussed. Next, the article’s key metaphors of a ‘map’ and a ‘compass’ are used to set out a key 
distinction between how cultural patterns are both ‘internalised’ in individuals and ‘institutionalised’ 
in policy contexts. Discussion follows on how this helps researchers to understand the navigation of 
both change and obstacles to change. Finally, the article addresses a further key distinction: 
between more abstract and intangible ‘institutional’ understandings and their more grounded and 
material ‘practical’ applications. This considers the added value of this analysis for (i) asking better 
questions, and (ii) learning from the answers to (iii) suggest adaptations that fit better with today’s 
complex policy contexts. In combination, the above analysis aims to provide a memorable ‘route 
map’ for policy scholars seeking to conduct new empirical research as well as new audiences such as 
students, practitioners, and scholars from other disciplines. 
 
Understanding Cultural Theory 
Cultural Theory (CT) has emerged as an important tool for policy analysis (Hood, 1998; Geva-May, 
2002, Klitgaard, 1997; Hoppe, 2011; Swedlow, 2002; 2011; 2014; 2017; 6 & Swedlow, 2016). 
Following Mary Douglas’ exposition of the theory (1970; 1982; 1992) and Thompson et al’s (1990) 
seminal refinement of it, there have been numerous attempts to develop its insights into the 
institutional factors governing policy effectiveness (e.g.Wildavsky, 1987; Thompson, 2008; 6, 2003). 
Links between culture and institutions are important; in short, ‘culture consists in institutions, which 
preserve cultural values and norms and give them authority’ (Brett 2000; cf.Douglas 1987). In turn, 
this provides the context for social interaction, shaping people’s preferences and justifications so 
that ‘everything human beings do or want is culturally biased’ (Mamadouh, 1999:396; see Figure 1). 
Yet how do people acquire ‘cultural bias’? And what types of bias are we talking about?  
[Figure 1 about here] 
For its proponents, the CT framework provides parsimonious answers, in a clear and comprehensive 
set of dimensions and propositions that are together claimed to ‘grasp the fundamental nature of 
sociality’ (Mamadouh 1999:396). CT’s success derives from the intuitive importance of these two 
high-level dimensions and empirical resonance of the four cultural ‘biases’ or ‘worldviews’ that 
result from their juxtaposition.  
[Figure 2 about here] 
The two high-level dimensions are represented as the vertical and horizontal axes in Figure 2. Each 
may be strong or weak. In strongly-regulated cultures actors are heavily constrained by rules and 
ascribed behaviour; in weakly-regulated cultures much less so. Meanwhile, in strongly-integrated 
cultures actors are connected and included in group membership; in weakly-integrated cultures 
much less so. As is now widely-known, when these high-level dimensions are combined, the CT 
framework reveals four ‘cultural biases’ or ‘worldviews’, each of which describes different ideal-




- Hierarchy (strong regulation, strong integration) sums up a bureau-professional relationship 
in which the policy process and policymakers’ behaviour are defined by strict rules and 
procedures that govern particular roles. 
- Individualism (weak regulation, weak integration) constructs policymakers (and the targets 
of policy) as more autonomous, utility-maximising individuals, who need to be incentivised 
by appeals to their self-interest.  
- Egalitarianism (weak regulation, strong integration) is represented by ‘mutualistic’ forms of 
relationship, in which policy may be co-produced through more collective norms and 
processes (but may yet flounder in the face of excessive homophily/groupthink or intra-
/inter-group conflict).  
- Fatalism (strong regulation, weak integration) sees social relations as imposed by external 
structures, and pressures to conform with any social group are weak. This leaves individuals 
isolated and withdrawn within a policy system where ‘co-operation is rejected, distrust 
widespread, and apathy reigns‘ (Hood, 1998:9). 
Researchers have applied CT readily to define some key battlefields for policy debate. A classic 
exemplar is the well-known conundrum of the ‘tragedy of the commons’ (Hardin, 1968; cf. 
Wildavsky, 2006:228; Buck, 1989). Here, in the absence of regulation to prevent the over-grazing of 
common-land, is the best answer hierarchical oversight and regulation by formal authorities (as 
Hardin suggests)? Or the peer oversight and moral regulation of egalitarian institutions (as 
suggested by Ostrom, 1990)? Should the land be privatized and regulated by the ‘invisible hand’ of a 
market in which motivated individualists are left to maximise their own utility? Indeed, is there any 
point in actively attempting to regulate, or should another hand - that of ‘fate’ - be left to prevail? 
Or, finally, should some ‘hybrid’ solution be constructed? While each scenario is theoretically 
possible, acceptance of each provokes a different set of detailed prescriptions for policy action, for 
which the relative advantages and disadvantages would need to be considered. Similar variations in 
the realms of possibility exist for myriad other policy issues, many of which are complex in modern 
policy contexts.  
Beyond this, CT has developed various tools and resources of use to scholars in their struggles for 
more reflective research and analysis:  
(i) ‘Static’ CT analysis (what life looks like from within each ideal-type)  
(ii) ‘Dynamic’ CT analysis (what to look for when ideal-types interact) 
(iii) Measurement tools (to strengthen such analysis)  
With regard to ‘static’ analysis, CT is now established as much more than a cultural classification 
scheme, yet its value as such should not be underestimated. Numerous ideal-type comparisons, 
often in the form of tables, have been compiled in CT research (see Figure 3 for a well-known 
example). Such ‘static’ analysis is an essential part of sensitising researchers to the fundamental, 
ideal-type building blocks of CT- allowing insights into what life looks like from within each ideal-
type. However, it says nothing of the prevalence of particular ideal-types in a particular context, nor 




‘birdspotting-type’ accusations still persist in discussions and peer review. Cultural analysis should 
not stop here.   
[Figure 3 about here] 
By contrast, ‘dynamic’ CT analysis examines what happens when ideal-types interact. Such analysis is 
accommodated in some key theoretical propositions (Thompson et al, 1990). First, the ‘requisite 
variety condition’ states that elements of all four ideal-types should be expected to be present 
within a policymaking system at any time. Second, the ‘compatibility condition’ states that viable 
patterns arise when social relations and cultural biases are mutually supportive of each other - and 
vice-versa (Thompson et al, 1990).  
Together, these propositions explain two important patterns between the four ideal-types: those of 
relative dominance and subordinacy, and those of relative congruence and dissonance. With regard 
to the former, the four ideal-types’ continuous rivalry in any policy context means that anomalies 
can breed and grow (6, 2003). This risks the system becoming unstable and the ‘destructive potential 
of the inevitable tensions and conflicts’ being released (6, 2003:402). Such perspectives develop 
those of the currently-dominant prescriptive approach for policy analysis using CT, namely that of 
‘clumsy solutions’ (Verweij & Thompson, 2006; Verweij, 2011) in which the voice of different ideal-
types is able to be heard and responded to (as opposed to one voice being dominant and drowning 
out the others; Thompson, 2008). Achievements here involve the cultivation of a ‘polyrational 
imagination’ that, by embracing more than a single ideal-type, takes institutional pluralism seriously 
(Davy, 2016). In terms of institutional analysis, this involves standing back to reflect on how the 
weaknesses of one worldview might be compensated by the strengths of another (Hoppe, 2011), so 
that ‘the impossible becomes possible when you see it from a different point of view’ (Stewart, 
1996). The lesson here is that failing to recognise other perspectives can cause considerable 
problems - wearing ‘institutional blinkers’ is not an option. For scholars interested in robust CT 
analysis, this requires careful critical reflection to avoid the selective acknowledgement and 
reporting of (i) particular cultural voices, or (ii) conversations between them.  
For example, in relation to climate change, Thompson (2003) identifies three competing ‘stories’ 
associated with different worldviews. In what he calls the ‘egalitarian story’, protagonists point to 
the profligate consumption and production patterns of the global North as the fundamental cause of 
global climate change. By contrast, the ‘hierarchist’ story asserts that of uncontrolled population 
growth in other regions of the world places local and global eco-systems under pressures that 
quickly become dangerously uncontrollable. Meanwhile, the ‘individualist’ story suggests that the 
price of natural resources is the most important factor in both controlling demand and footing the 
bill for environmental protection. In sum, while each story contains its own internal logic, it stands in 
tension with the others and holds only part of the solution to this policy problem. Institutional 
pluralism ensures that the institutional blinkers are removed and appropriate attention and weight 
attached to each of these stories in allowing more effective policy solutions to emerge.  
When a state of congruence is achieved in a balance of perspectives, the above tensions and 
conflicts are minimised. Congruence is about the ‘fit’ between perceptions of how much of each 
ideal-type there actually is in any given context, and how much there should be for the system to be 
optimally viable (Simmons, 2016). A key task for research here is to understand how any 




indicate an excess or deficit of hierarchy? Or of individualism, egalitarianism or fatalism? And how 
might we address significant excesses or deficits? CT provides a way of framing more critically 
reflective research on these issues - whether this is reflection ‘in-action’ (thinking carefully about 
the situation that is unfolding), ‘on-action’ (thinking retrospectively about the effects of how a 
situation was handled), or ‘for-action’ (thinking about future actions with the intention of making 
changes or improvements) (Schon, 1983; Killion & Todnem, 1991). In other words, CT research not 
only has to show that its information is valid (at the nexus between ‘data’, ‘questioning’ and 
‘reflection in-action’), but that it is insightful (at the nexus between ‘interpretation’, ‘learning’ and 
‘reflection on-action’) and of practical use (at the nexus between ‘findings’, ‘adaptation’ and 
‘reflection for-action’). Hence, it is highly feasible for scholars to ask, for a particular policy context: 
‘How would things appear if I were to look at them through the lens of 
hierarchy, individualism, egalitarianism, or fatalism?’ 
 
‘Reflection in-action’ 
‘How much does what I actually observe around me look more or less 
like one or other - or some combination - of these possibilities?’ 
‘To what extent does that reflect a pattern of dominance and 
subordinacy, or of congruence and dissonance?’ 
 
‘Reflection on-action’ ‘What effects does that produce in terms of behaviours, or ‘operational 
practices’?’ 
‘Should any action be taken as a result?’ 
‘Reflection for-action’ 
‘If so, what should be done?’ 
In sum, sensitisation to each of CT’s four worldviews (through static analysis) is an important step 
towards deeper reflection about their (dynamic) interaction. Static CT analysis increases the power 
of this reflection (allowing scholars to see things more clearly and quickly), while dynamic CT analysis 
determines the direction of it (allowing them to weigh the implications). Importantly, as Swedlow 
(2002:275) points out, this enables policy researchers to consider such things as: 
(i) When policy change requires cultural change  
(e.g. research examining ‘Experience-Based Design’ shows that change from a 
hierarchical to a more egalitarian mindset was required before medical professionals 
would engage in a process of more person-centred and co-productive healthcare service 
design; Bate & Robert, 2007)  
(ii) When cultural change makes policy change more likely  
(e.g. research shows that direct challenges to the appropriateness of traditional job 
classifications on the basis of stereotypical gender roles have led to the 
deinstitutionalization of this practice in many organizations; Oliver, 1992) 
(iii) Which policies are likely to reproduce and reinforce existing cultural configurations 
(e.g. research shows how self-regulating professions use codes of conduct and codes of 
ethics to clarify the responsibilities of members and articulate standards; Perlis & 
Shannon, 2012) 
(iv) Which policies are likely to challenge and reshape them  
(e.g. research shows how smoking laws and seat belt enforcement have established and 
reinforced new normative patterns in the UK; Knott et al., 2008) 
However, while CT’s conceptual and theoretical tools travel easily across a wide range of contexts, 




for a review). Although this may seem curious, some brief explanations are offered here before a 
way forward is suggested.  
Measurement to support static CT analysis is difficult for at least two reasons. First, there are issues 
of (de)contextualization. For example, early attempts to produce generalised measures of cultural 
bias used a decontextualized survey instrument that was free of any social context (Dake, 1991; 
1992). These attempts were largely unsuccessful (Ripberger et al, 2015). Critics were unsurprised, 
arguing that cultural biases must be considered in combination with contextualised patterns of social 
relations (e.g. Rayner, 1992). However, contextualized measures bring problems of their own; both 
in lacking wider comparability and in the cost and effort of developing bespoke measures that 
accurately capture the necessary detail. To further complicate matters, Swedlow (2007; 2017) raises 
issues of what Douglas (1966) calls ‘purity’ and ‘pollution’. In short, this means that any internal 
consistency in people’s cultural ideal-type worldviews (i.e. ‘purity’) may be compromised as it 
mingles with and is influenced by other worldviews (i.e. ‘pollution’). As it does, this pollution may 
again confound accurate measurement.  
In contrast, Ripberger et al’s (2015) review of the field suggests that the prospects of measurement 
to support dynamic CT analysis appear to have recently become more promising (including 
improvements in face, construct, concurrent and predictive validity). Importantly, a key factor in this 
is stronger recognition of the theoretical justification for measuring cultural bias in ways that also 
takes into account patterns of social relations and actual behaviours.  
Overcoming Challenges of Measurement 
One new approach, developed by this author (Simmons, 2016), seeks to overcome the above 
challenges of measurement. This approach uses CT to ‘map’ the degree of cultural congruence in 
different policy contexts. It is re-presented briefly here as a way to both operationalise CT and to 
build on the ‘map’ and ‘compass’ metaphors outlined in the introduction (to which we also return in 
the next section of the article).  
In short, Simmons’ (2016) research was conducted in a public administration context, focusing on 
public service users’ relationships with their service provider and the effects of this on their 
willingness and ability to ‘voice’ their opinions (cf.Hirschman, 1970). CT was used as a theoretical 
lens for understanding how cultural-institutional patterns serve to facilitate or constrain user voice. 
The results showed these effects to be considerable. In what follows, however, the focus is more on 
the approach taken by Simmons’ (2016) and how this helps overcome many of the objections made 
against earlier attempts to operationalise CT in survey research:  
 First, the instrument was based on a deeply contextualised approach; namely, a preliminary 
phase of qualitative fieldwork in three locations from which detailed analysis of semi-
structured interviews (N=80) elicited four key themes in the patterns of social relations that 
mattered most to service users (namely ‘courtesy and respect’; ‘how knowledge is valued’; 
‘how fairness and equity issues are resolved’; and ‘how rules are set and policed’).  
 Second, issues of purity and pollution were addressed by taking an open, non-judgmental 
approach. Each of the four key dimensions was operationalized equally against each of the 
four CT ideal-types. This resulted in four statements being developed for each of the four 




respondents in three different public service settings (social care (N=116); leisure services 
(N=318) and public housing (N=109)) were then invited to rate each individual statement on 
a 5-point Likert-type scale.  
 Third, given that congruence is about the ‘fit’ between perceptions of how much of each 
ideal-type there ‘actually is’ in any given context, and how much there ‘should be’ for the 
system to be viable, each statement was re-worded according to the former in a second set 
of statements (see Figure 4). Ratings for each statement were then aggregated and 
presented on a radial plot (see Figure 5). Similarities in respondents’ ratings of how things 
‘actually are’ and how things ‘should be’ represent greater congruence; differences 
represent greater dissonance (see Figures 6a and 6b).  
[Figure 4 about here] 
 Fourth, account was given to the theoretical justification for measuring cultural bias in ways 
that also takes into account patterns of social relations and actual behaviours. The 
statements were explicitly intended to capture the nature of a set of specific social relations 
rather than the essence of each cultural bias. In this way, differences in users’ scores against 
these statements were used only in relative, rather than absolute, terms. Nevertheless, it is 
only these relative differences that are important in defining the extent of congruence and 
dissonance.  
 Finally, adding to the ‘face’ and ‘construct’ validity in the above approach, Simmons (2016) 
was also able to show its ‘predictive’ validity in terms of how notions of congruence 
correlated with other survey items measuring (i) respondents’ perceptions of the quality of 
service relations, (ii) service performance and (iii) the availability of ‘good opportunities’ for 
user voice.  
[Figure 5 about here] 
[Figures 6a and 6b about here] 
In defining conditions of cultural ‘congruence’ and/or ‘dissonance’, this map is able to identify the 
terrain in which researchers and policy actors attention might be productively focused, and where 
particular forms of action might be most appropriate (cf. Simmons, 2016). 6 and Swedlow (2016: 
872) describe Simmons’ (2016) approach as an ‘innovative operationalization’ and ‘methodological 
advance’ for CT. Specifically, it allows a response to some key questions, such as: ‘How would we 
know when the prevailing ‘institutional logics’ have become suboptimal in the governance of 
problems in our particular context?’ and ‘How would we use CT to know which direction(s) to move 
in?’.  
For example, in Figure 6b congruence is most evident in the case of ‘day care’, where the shapes 
formed by the ‘is’ and the ‘should be’ statements are the most similar. By contrast, in the ‘leisure’ 
case there appears to be a particular blind spot in relation to egalitarianism (and to a lesser extent 
individualism). Meanwhile, in the ‘housing’ case there is work to do to close the gap on at least three 
dimensions – individualism, egalitarianism and fatalism. Knowing such things allows policy actors to 
understand more about what action to take. In this regard it should be noted that, even in the day 
care case, the relative congruence observed is an achievement that must be actively maintained. In 




process of ‘questioning’ (Turnbull, 2013). In the leisure case, for example, ‘what might it look like to 
be more egalitarian?’. 
There remains at least one of the above objections that Simmons’ (2016) approach does not 
overcome. This is the cost and effort of developing bespoke measures – even if these support more 
productive insights and reflections on the institutional factors governing policy effectiveness. In 
response, a purist might argue that ‘organisations run surveys all the time on various issues; why not 
invest here?’. However, in an environment of financial resource constraint, such contentions must be 
acknowledged.  
More fundamentally, there is another, more functional problem. As Argyris (1976:365) observes, 
effective learning requires both ‘valid information’ and ‘receptivity to corrective feedback’. However, 
while the CT ‘map’ claims to provide valid information, there is no guarantee that policy actors will 
be receptive to this feedback. This brings back into the discussion how these actors are influenced by 
their ‘internal compass’. An actor’s ‘internal compass’ takes in the values and worldviews that are 
compatible with their approach toward particular policy issues (6 & Swedlow, 2016). As a reference 
point from which everything can be checked to determine a sense of ‘rightness’ (Smythe & Norton, 
2007:74), this internal compass directs their ‘judgement’ (Vickers, 1965) and ‘fast-thinking’ 
(Kahneman, 2011). No bad thing, perhaps – unless this starts sending them off-course. Yet faulty 
compass readings arise when thought-styles become ‘cultural blinkers’, plotting a course ahead that 
blocks out other constructions of the problem. In this way, the patterns of relations and cultural 
bias that are internalised in individuals sometimes form such ‘credible commitments’ that they 
hold actors back from exploring alternatives or distort their policy orientation and navigation. 
Examples abound, such as commitments to market principles of ‘value for money’ in public 
procurement that ignore other policy goals such as carbon emission issues, or commitments to 
restrictive planning regulations and/or protection of the green belt that ignore other policy goals 
such as the provision of affordable housing.   
A helpful addition to Simmons’ (2016) measures of the degree of institutionalisation of cultural 
biases in the ‘map’ would therefore be a measure of the extent of people’s internalisation of 
such perspectives in their ‘internal compass’. Value may be claimed here for comparability in the 
‘framing of cultural configurations’ – or how policymakers use institutions – in both ‘compass’ and 
‘map’. Arguably, measurement of the compass therefore might therefore involve a relatively 
straightforward extension of Simmons’ (2016) methodology by simply asking respondents to 
both ‘rank and rate’ the competing attitude statements in each section of Figure 3. 
Nevertheless, a more reliable technique might be using Q methodology with these statements 
(Brown, 1993; Durning, 1989). A robust method for combining the sorting and ranking of 
statements with factor analysis and hierarchical cluster analysis, this approach has the potential 
to add further insights.  
In combination, having a means of ‘measuring’ the compass as well as the map provides a more 
detailed understanding of the dynamics governing the ‘tension-field’ in particular policymaking 
contexts. This includes the directions in which ‘receptivity to corrective feedback’ is lacking, thereby 




particular movements on the map that might be needed to effect appropriate adaptations and 
change. These issues form the focus for the next section of this article. 
Using the ‘Map’ and the ‘Compass’ for Policy Analysis and Policy Navigation 
CT researchers’ ability to measure differences in the extent to which patterns of social relations and 
cultural bias are both ‘internalised’ in individuals (i.e. in their ‘internal compass’) and 
‘institutionalised’ in particular policy contexts (i.e. in ways that can be ‘mapped’) is important. Earlier 
we asked how policymakers develop effective policymaking strategies when they are so limited by 
bounded rationality, and whether their ‘cognitive frailties’ make them over-reliant on a combination 
of rational and irrational informational shortcuts to act quickly and make adequate decisions. 
Measurement helps researchers to answer these questions and reduce the need for such shortcuts. 
Indeed, given that policy actors rarely possess an infallible ‘internal compass’, a reliable ‘map’ 
provides them with an invaluable tool against which to check they are on track. As Turnbull (2013: 
125) asserts, ‘individuals hold the capacity to reflect upon and problematize their place within a 
field, for example by reflecting upon their own entrenched ways of doing things’. CT analysis 
supports this by helping scholars to demonstrate the extent to which policy actors are able to 
orientate themselves ‘appropriately’ toward policy problems and navigate the actions that might be 
taken to address them. In this sense, this article addresses questions raised in the introduction about 
the extent to which institutional patterns tend to structure policy problems and guide policymakers’ 
response, and how institutional analysis can help by identifying better questions to promote policy 
learning.  
However, two questions remain. First, if policy actors are both over-reliant on their internal compass 
and unreceptive to corrective feedback, how might institutions be designed to limit their 
autonomous powers? Meanwhile, if they are more receptive, how might work be undertaken with 
them to recalibrate their compass readings? In either case, CT measurement can be used to help 
ensure that the direction in which their internal compass points them is not too far away from 
where their attention is most needed. The fit between their compass readings and the problem 
context is therefore significant. If there is a good fit, fast thinking is more likely to lead to successful 
action strategies and policy navigation. However, if this is not the case, a different approach may be 
demanded. In this way, the ‘map’ and ‘compass’ are each useful tools, but must be harnessed and 
used in conjunction for effective navigation. For example, in his highly influential text ‘Beyond 
Rational Management’, Quinn (1988: xv) distinguishes between one decision-making frame that is 
‘purposive, static and entropic’, and another that is ‘holistic, dynamic and generative’. Policymakers’ 
‘purposive frame’ is the equivalent of their ‘internal compass’; in their ‘holistic frame’ they map a 
wider range of perspectives. Importantly, Quinn (1988) observes that ‘exceptional individuals’ do not 
achieve excellence by using one or other frame but by using both in conjunction. 
While this may be so, if one or other of the ‘compass’ or ‘map’ is perceived to be unreliable, it is 
likely to be disregarded. So how do relationships between the two pay out? Notions of ‘purity’ and 
‘pollution’ (cf. Swedlow, 2017) are invoked here to explore the field of relationships between the 
compass and map. This centres particularly on their different ‘purity claims’. Moreover, in assessing 
how the nature of the boundary between the compass and map may vary at different times in the 
policy process, Stirling’s (2006: 101) distinction between the ‘opening up’ or ‘closing down’ of policy 




‘If it is about ‘closing down’ the policy process, then the aim is to assist decision-making by 
cutting through the messy, intractable and conflict prone diversity of views and develop in a 
clear authoritative prescriptive recommendation… On the other hand, if it is about ‘opening 
up’ the process, the focus is on revealing wider policy discourses and interpretations of the 
available evidence’. 
How might we encapsulate and understand these distinctions? In short, the ‘internal compass’ is 
careful to keep its boundaries high, as both a reference point and a container for ‘principled’ 
judgment. In Quinn’s (1988) terms, it is ‘purposive, static and entropic’. The map’s ‘polyrationality’ 
can therefore feel confrontational and its ‘corrective feedback’ challenging, which in turn affects 
‘receptivity’. At the above point of ‘closure’ of the policy process, where a clear decision is needed, it 
therefore filters this polyrationality, which it views as ‘noise pollution’. This practice of filtering 
underpins its purity claim; that it enables decision-makers to see and think more clearly in the sense-
making process.  
By contrast, the ‘map’ maintains more open boundaries to develop an overview of the policy 
context. It is a checkpoint for patterns of congruence and dissonance, remaining open to all 
perspectives and possibilities without placing judgment on them. It filters this information using 
polyrationality. This practice of filtering underpins its purity claim of providing ‘valid information’ 
(Argyris, 1976), thereby simplifying complexity and providing clarity for ‘better-informed’ decisions. 
In Quinn’s (1988) terms, this process is ‘holistic, dynamic and generative’, providing useful 
‘corrective feedback’ to the process of ‘reflection for-action’.  
It should be noted here that ‘objections to’ or ‘acceptance of’ each other’s claims can provoke either 
conflict or co-operation. Hence, the discourse from compass to map may be: ‘Don’t stay open! 
Decisions have to be made sometime and scanning the environment is no longer helpful!’ The 
response may be: ‘OK, but we need to have confidence in those decisions. Show that you have taken 
our inputs seriously if you want us to quieten down’. Conversely, the discourse from map to compass 
may be: ‘Don’t stay closed! Things are complex and uncertain and you need to stay aware!’. Yet here, 
the response may be: ‘OK, but we need to have confidence that you have ‘valid information’ if we are 
going to be convinced to open up’.  
At the heart of this are the key issues of questioning, learning and adaptation. In sum, (i) each 
perspective asks and answers questions differently, and (ii) each holds the key to different influences 
on the effectiveness of learning: i.e. ‘valid information’ (map) and ‘receptivity to corrective feedback’ 
(compass). In learning to co-operate, as successful policy navigation necessitates, adaptation 
therefore becomes a ‘dance’, with at least two elements: First, as either the ‘holistic’ frame (map) or 
‘purposive’ frame (compass) is pulled forward, so the other is pushed into the background; Second, 
at times when the policy process is ‘opened up’ the map is more likely to be foregrounded, and vice-
versa. For conflict to be avoided and greater co-operation to be made possible, the focus therefore 
must be on greater acceptance of each other’s ‘purity claims’.  
In sum, researchers’ knowledge of policy actors’ compass bearings are important. This can show how 
open or closed actors are to particular forms of corrective feedback. This might lead to productive 
discussions with policy actors about engaging in critical reflection of how well their compass 
readings ‘fit’ with the policy context. However, such conversations require researchers to also 




(in)congruence are communicated clearly as a way to help actors in navigating the policy terrain. For 
‘research with impact’, this task could include identifying opportunities for change through more 
grounded ‘institutional work’.   
This brings us to the final question identified in the introduction: that of how research can help 
identify and promote appropriate adaptations in particular policy contexts through the institutional 
work of ‘creating, maintaining and disrupting institutions’ (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006). For some, 
this is a sticky question: if institutional issues underpin the policy context, in real terms what can be 
done? ‘Culture’ is notoriously difficult to change, and ‘institutionalisation’ notoriously difficult to 
overcome. However, as Pellizzoni (2001:59) observes, ‘seemingly intractable controversies may 
often be faced at the level of [discourse and] practices’. Perhaps the answer therefore lies in CT’s 
core reciprocal interrelations between cultural bias, patterns of social relations and ‘operational 
practices’ (Figure 1; cf.6, 2011; 2015; 2016). In this way, ‘learning-by-thinking’ strategies (i.e. 
reflection) may be supplemented or even usurped in the process of adaptation by practical 
‘learning-by-doing’ strategies.  
This links notions of ‘the institutional’ to those of ‘the practical’ in institutional work. Importantly, 
Lawrence & Suddaby (2006:219) recognise institutional work as ‘intelligent, situated institutional 
action’. In recognition of this, for example, Simmons (2016) was able to use the above findings from 
his research to sit with public service managers, staff and user representatives, and discuss 
significant differences on the ‘map’ and how they might be reduced. This involved ‘such purposive 
actions as the redrafting of standard operating procedures, establishment of new mechanisms for 
stakeholder ‘voice’, provision of new staff training opportunities, and new, ‘nudge’-type activities in 
the phrasing and presentation of communications’ (Simmons, 2016:949). Specific practical remedies 
that are applied in different policy contexts need to be bespoke to the policy issues they face. 
However, the tools of CT analysis can provide a guide for the deeply practical, situated ‘institutional 
work’ from which they might emerge. Effective navigation, particularly in an environment of 
complexity and ambiguity, therefore might be said to depend on greater reflection and the 
acquisition of such ‘practical wisdom’ through ‘practical learning’ (Rhodes, 2015). 
Conclusions 
Linking operational practices and systems back to institutionalised cultural biases and patterns of 
social relations, CT allows researchers to shine a light on new possibilities for addressing policy 
problems. Key reference points range from the relatively fast (e.g. following the direction given by 
our ‘internal compass’), to the relatively slow (e.g. deeper ‘reflection on values and norms and, by 
implication, the social structures which were instrumental in their development’: Greenwood, 
1998:1049). In short, it is argued here that dangers lie in wait if policy actors lean too heavily and 
uncritically on their ‘internal compass’ when navigating policy problems, and that deeper reflection 
is important for developing greater capacities for questioning (Turnbull, 2013), learning (Argyris, 
1976) and adaptation (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006). 
CT provides a useful framework for structuring research inquiry that leads to better institutional 
questioning, learning and adaptation in different (and especially complex) policy contexts. Yet this 
article argues that insufficient thought is given to such institutional issues. In particular, the article 




controversial. This has involved an attempt to move beyond the banality of ‘birdspotting’-type 
narratives in CT analysis, and to lay some of myths about CT’s practical value. The article raises the 
particular importance of operationalising CT using ‘map’ and ‘compass’ measurements as a way to 
make sense of these contexts. Relations of relative (in)congruence are particularly worthy of policy 
attention, whether to generate a creative institutional dialogue or to help avoid counterproductive 
institutional conflicts. Yet patterns of (in)congruence are not always readily visible. Researchers can 
therefore play an important role in robustly mapping out this terrain and providing this map as ‘valid 
information’ for policy debate.  Meanwhile measurements of the compass show how likely it is that 
policy actors will engage on this terrain.  
This article makes three further assertions: (i) that current prescriptive approaches for policy analysis 
using CT, such as the notion of ‘clumsy solutions’, generally lack the precision of measurement, (ii) 
that in conjunction, the ‘map’ and ‘compass’ provide researchers with the tools to support more 
effective policy navigation, and (iii) that more detailed understandings of the dynamics governing 
particular movements on the map are needed to effect appropriate institutional adaptations and 
change. As noted above, given that policy actors rarely possess an infallible ‘internal compass’, a 
reliable ‘map’ provides an invaluable tool against which to check they are on track. 
To conclude, then, this article suggests that in the face of considerable complexity and uncertainty, 
orientation and navigation are demanding and ongoing tasks. However, by adding a map to 
policymakers’ internal compass, researchers can provide a sense of where they are going and 
direction about how to find their way. There remains a need to connect these things with a detailed 
engagement of the terrain in order to align this research with practical action and institutional 
‘work’. It is hoped that through the ‘map’ and ‘compass’ approach outlined in this article there is a 
potential basis for moving further forward, and more speedily, in this direction.  
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Figure 1: Constituting Institutions: Reciprocal Effects Between CT’s Core Elements 
 
 Figure 2:  The Dimensions and Cultural Biases of CT 
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Figure 4: Grouped Statements Measuring Cultural Congruence in Public Service 
Organizations (source: Simmons, 2016) 
  
Themes and Cultural Biases How the service ‘actually is’ How the service ‘should be’ 
1: How fairness and equity issues are resolved 
Cultural bias: Hierarchy ‘Day care/Leisure/Housing  services 
are only be provided for those who 
need them most’ 
‘Day care/Leisure/Housing services 
should only be provided for those 
who need them most’ 
Cultural bias: Individualism ‘Individuals are given too little choice 
about the kind of service they get’ 
‘Individuals should be given more 
choice about the kind of service they 
get’ 
Cultural bias: Egalitarianism ‘Everybody in my community has the 
same chance of getting the service’ 
‘Everybody in my community should 
have the same chance of getting the 
service’ 
Cultural bias: Fatalism ‘It is a matter of chance or luck that 
people get day care/leisure/housing 
services’ 
‘People should not expect to get day 
care/leisure/housing services unless 
they are lucky’ 
2: How knowledge is valued 
Cultural bias: Hierarchy ‘Users trust the experts to organise 
the service’  
‘Users should trust the experts to 
organise the service’  
Cultural bias: Individualism ‘The service gives priority to what 
individuals say they want’ 
‘The service should give priority to 
what individuals say they want’ 
Cultural bias: Egalitarianism ‘The service is run in line with the 
views of users as a whole’  
‘The service should be run in line 
with the views of users as a whole’  
Cultural bias: Fatalism ‘I am wary of those who claim to 
know what is best for the service’ 
‘Users should be wary of anyone 
who claims to know what is best for 
the service’ 
3: How rules are set and policed 
Cultural bias: Hierarchy ‘The Council imposes strict rules to 
tell users how to behave’ 
‘The Council should impose strict 
rules to tell users how to behave’ 
Cultural bias: Individualism ‘Individuals are free to use the 
service however they like’ 
‘Individuals should be free to use the 
service however they like’ 
Cultural bias: Egalitarianism ‘Users know how to behave without 
a lot of rules and regulations’ 
‘Users should know how to behave 
without a lot of rules and 
regulations’ 
Cultural bias: Fatalism ‘There is no point having lots of rules 
because people don’t obey them’  
‘There is no point having lots of rules 
because people won’t obey them’  
4: Courtesy and respect 
Cultural bias: Hierarchy ‘Users respect the experts’ decisions 
about the service’ 
‘Users should respect the experts’ 
decisions about the service’ 
Cultural bias: Individualism ‘The staff accept that individuals 
know best what they need’ 
‘The staff should accept that 
individuals know best what they 
need’ 
Cultural bias: Egalitarianism ‘The service takes heed of what the 
user community has to say’  
‘The service should take heed of 
what the user community has to say’  
Cultural bias: Fatalism ‘In my experience, users do not have 
any power’ 
‘Service users should not expect to 





































Figure 6a: ‘User Perceptions of How the Service ‘Is’’ (source: Simmons, 2016)
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